

SSPPP 2022

Ca' Foscari University Venice

ABSTRACTS OF THE SEMINARS

Valeria Bizzari (Husserl Archives, KU Leuven)

The World of Dream

Despite the interest that dreaming has always elicited in philosophy, it is quite difficult to find a systematic and elaborated account of this complex phenomenon. In particular, if we consider the phenomenological tradition, it seems that the priority has been given to those activities that belong to the awake life of the transcendental subject. Nonetheless, it is interesting to notice that many phenomenologists found themselves wondering about the nature of dreaming, an activity which seems to be both noematically and noetically peculiar.

Merleau-Ponty describes dreaming as the “world of myth”, a depersonalized reality where activity and passivity are intertwined in a chiasmatic manner, and the waking world is still present. As an echo of his words, the psychoanalyst James Hillman names dreaming “the Underworld”: an unconscious realm that is invisibly but deeply entangled with the waking one. Putting into dialogue phenomenology and other disciplines (such as psychoanalysis and neuroscience), the aim of this talk is to explore the world of dreaming and through it some of the main important phenomenological notions: intentionality, presentation, presentification, attention, ego-splitting etc.

Which kind of intentionality is at stake while we are dreaming? Is there any difference between dreaming and imagining? Does self-awareness correspond to wakefulness? Or has dreaming a peculiar form of self-awareness? Which is the role of the “dream world” in our “lifeworld”?

We will see how phenomenology has offered different but enriching accounts of dreaming (Merleau-Ponty and Husserl in particular) and how these perspectives can find in psychoanalysis (Hillman) an enlightening resource to explore the different structures of subjectivity, continuously wandering through a plurality of worlds.

Reading list

Rudolf Bernet, “Unconscious Consciousness in Husserl and Freud”, *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 1: 327–351, 2002.

Hillman, James. *Blu Fires*, Routledge 2008 (section “Work with Dreams”).

Husserl, Edmund. *Phantasy, Image Consciousness and Memory*, Springer 2006. (pp.42-44; Appendix IX: pp. 177-184 pp.359-361; pp. 659-665).

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. *The Visible and the Invisible*, Northwestern University Press 1968 (pp.1-13;Chapter “The Chiasm”pp. 130-155; pp.262-263).

Warren, Nicholas de. “The Inner Night: Towards a Phenomenology of (Dreamless) Sleep.” In Lohmar, Dieter, and Yamaguchi, Ichiro. *On Time - New Contributions to the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time*. Dordrecht: Springer 2010. pp. 273-294.

Nicolas de Warren (Pennsylvania State University)

The Life-World of Trust

The aim of this session is to circumscribe the foundational significance of trust for human existence. Surprisingly, philosophical accounts – phenomenological or otherwise – of the life-world and inter-subjectivity have on the whole neglected the indispensable and largely unspoken dimension of trust in human flourishing. In this session, we shall examine the relations between three existential forms of trust: trust in the world, trust in others (or inter-subjective trust), and self-trust. Two main insights will be developed. First: relations of trust involve an edging, or lining, of the trusted Other in the self and, by the same token, a lining of the self in the entrusted Other. In this manner, the trusted Other is carried within me just as (much as) I am carried within the Other to whom I have entrusted myself. What is to live upon trust with others is for others to necessarily participate and partake in our lives, much as participate and partake in the lives of others. Beholden thus to others, we are not self-begotten beings. Second: relationships of trust inherently involve a responsibility (or honoring of trust) to which we are committed without knowing exactly what the commitment of trust means or demands of us. Essential to this conception is an understanding of trust as a dialogical relationship where the meaningfulness of trust itself becomes entrusted to the dialogical relationship that transpires between

those who trust. Each of us is the keeper of our trust in the triadic structure of its dialogical constitution.

Reading list

Shakespeare, W. *King Lear*

Handouts provided to the participants

Roberta Dreon (Ca' Foscari University Venice)

Riccardo Valenti (Ca' Foscari University Venice/University of Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Beyond the Nature-Culture Divide. Phenomenological and Pragmatist Forms of Non-Reductive Naturalism

This lecture suggests a comparison between Merleau-Ponty's and Dewey's forms of naturalism. It will be based, on the one side, on Merleau-Ponty's courses on nature as well as on his lectures on infant psychology, and, on the other side, on Dewey's *Experience and Nature* and on some parts of his *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*. Both Dewey and Merleau-Ponty independently developed forms of naturalism, emphasizing the continuity between natural and cultural, physical and psychical, body and mind. Both of them tried to avoid ontological reductionism as well as ontological dualism; they adopted an open-minded approach towards scientific inquiries while escaping the mere translation of philosophical issues into a properly scientific vocabulary. However, the Pragmatist approach to naturalism seems more capable than phenomenology to avoid any residue of foundationalism or hierarchical ordering between nature and culture and to develop arguments for considering the loop effects or feedback actions introduced by the advent of culture, meaning and language in re-shaping already existing forms of organic-environmental interactions.

Reading list

Dewey, John. (1981). *Experience and Nature*. Vol.1 of *The Later Works*, Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois U.P.

Dewey, J. (1991). *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, Vol.12 of *The Later Works*, Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois U.P.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1994), *La Nature. Notes. Cours du Collège de France*, Paris: Éditions du Seuil.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (2001), *Psychologie et pédagogie de l'enfant. Cours de Sorbonne 1949-1952*, Lagrasse: Verdier.

Matteo Giannasi (Ca' Foscari University Venice)

Environmental Phenomenology? The significance of Husserl's concept of environment.

The lecture addresses the notion of environment (*Umwelt*) in Husserl's phenomenological project. The concept of environment is discussed in relation to other (at least *prima facie*) semantically related phenomenological concepts, such as surroundings (*Umgebung*), horizon (*Horizont*), world of life (*Lebenswelt*), life environment (*Lebensumwelt*) – and of course world (*Welt*).

Husserl's notion of environment is illustrated with respect to two different issues: on one hand, whether its scope is restricted or “regional”, or rather more general and systematic, in Husserl's phenomenology; on the other, what role that notion plays in the characterization of specific regional realities, and what its relation is to other important concepts, such as communication, nature, and culture.

As to the first, structural, question, the lecture addresses the different nuances of the expression “*Umwelt*” in Husserl's general presentations of the phenomenological project, most notably with respect to different phases of the process of transcendental investigation: the natural attitude, transcendental reduction, the process of constitution, etc.

As to the second issue, we shall attempt to explicate the significance of the specifically phenomenological concept of environment, in texts about the structure of social reality – both as cultural reality and as shared reality – and about its relation to other domains. Certain paradoxes, or counterintuitive consequences, determined by the specifically transcendental framework, shall be evoked and briefly discussed.

Reading list

Hua I. Husserl, E. (1950). *Cartesiansche Meditationen and Pariser Vorträge*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff; *Cartesian Meditations: An introduction to phenomenology*. D. Cairns (Trans.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960. §§ 48-64.

Hua IV. Husserl, E. (1952). *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhof; *Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book*. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989. §§ 48-57 and §§ 62-64.

Hua VI. Husserl, E. (1954). *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff; *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. D. Carr (Trans.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1970. §§ 8-9 and §§ 28-33, and *Appendix III*.

Burt Hopkins (Associated Member, UMR-CNRS 8163 STL/ University of Lille)

Life-World, Science, and Historicity in Husserl's Phenomenology

My presentation will circumscribe the *transcendental* meaning of the concept of the 'life-world' in Husserl's last writings gathered together in the *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1954/1970) that originally date from the last decade of his life (the 1930s). Because I am convinced that the *core* meaning of 'life-world' cannot be separated from Husserl's phenomenological method, and because that method is critically driven, my presentation will begin with an account of what I see as the phenomenological method's two most crucial critical components. Those components being 1) its aspiration to realize the *rigorous* ideal of a *presuppositionless* philosophical science and 2) its transcendental critique—in the Kantian spirit of an account of the conditions of possibility of natural and exact science—of the objective (mathematical physics), exact (mathematics and logic), and human (psychology, anthropology, sociology) sciences. This beginning will allow me to situate the emergence of the transcendental *phenomenon* of the life-world within the context of Husserl's method's two critical concerns.

I will show that when presented in this way the life-world as a phenomenon emerges in response to both of Husserl's critical concerns. It emerges in response to the *first*, with Husserl's self-critical recognition that his initial formulation of the method that serves phenomenology's ideal of *presuppositionlessness*—the *transcendental* phenomenological reduction as presented in the *Ideas*, *Cartesian Meditations*, and *Formal and Transcendental Logic*—harbors a heretofore concealed *presupposition*: the phenomenologically *pre-thematic* (and therefore "pregiven") *horizon* of the *pre-*

theoretical life-world of everyday life and all the individual and communal *practical* activities that that life involves. It emerges in response to the *second*, with Husserl's related recognition that this pre-theoretical horizon is also *presupposed* by the paradigmatic objective science—physics—and the *symbolic* mathematics that is a crucial condition of that science's possibility.

I will conclude with a brief account of Husserl's initial investigations into these two presuppositions, which disclosed that they both share a common historically situated and socially relative horizon, and his response—fragmentary at best—to this disclosure. I will show that his response to the first (methodological) presupposition is to formulate the project of a phenomenological science of the life-world, composed of the twin tasks of investigating its ontology and then providing an account of that ontology's transcendental phenomenological condition of possibility. While his response to the second presupposition (in back of objective science)—which for me is the more interesting and important—I will try to *show* involves the phenomenological-historical reflection that uncovers the *alienation* from the life-world that occurs when the symbolically driven *method* of mathematical physics is interpreted by its originators (Galileo, Descartes and Newton) and all who follow them as the *true* science of the being (the true *ontology*) of the *natural* world. And I will conclude by *arguing* that what is uncovered here adumbrates the basis of Husserl's *radical* claim in his last work that the formalized meaning at the foundation of the exact science of modern symbolic mathematics has an *historical* dimension; albeit a dimension that is *not* historical in the sense of the *empirically* historical investigation of the contingencies of *res gestae* but in the *phenomenological* sense of the epochally dated meaning—the *historicity*—belonging to the exact meanings constitutive of that foundation.

Reading list

De Santis, Daniele Majolino, Claudio, Hopkins, Burt eds., *Routledge Handbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, (UK: Routledge, 2020)

Gadamer, H.G. "The Science of the Life-World," in *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, trans. and ed.

David Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977: 182-197).

Hopkins, Burt, *The Origin of the Logic of Symbolic Mathematics: Edmund Husserl and Jacob Klein* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011).

Husserl, Edmund. *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*, ed. Walter Biemel, Husserliana VI (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1954, 1976); translated by David Carr as *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

Klein, Jacob “Phenomenology and the History of Science,” in *Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl*, ed. Marvin Farber (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1940), 143–163; reprinted in Jacob Klein, *Lectures and Essays*, ed. Robert B. Williamson and Elliott Zuckerman (Annapolis, Md.: St. John’s Press, 1985), 65–84.

Trizio, Emiliano, *Philosophy’s Nature: Husserl’s Phenomenology, Natural Science, and Metaphysics* (UK: Routledge, 2020).

Claudio Majolino (University of Lille)

Phenomenologists Playing Games. From Chaos to Kosmos and Back

Many authors belonging to the so-called “phenomenological tradition” have variously thematized the relationship between the (apparently ludic) activity of *playing games* and the (allegedly serious) philosophical attempt to *make sense of the world*. Brentano was not only a major chess player and published author of riddles, but also a theorist of their philosophical relevance. Husserl has firmly maintained that the crisis of Pre-Socratic cosmologies, the birth of Plato’s genuine philosophy and the first breakthrough of transcendental thinking are all momentous side-effects of one major event: the Sophists “playing the game of philosophy”. Drawing from Kant, Heidegger has openly correlated the concepts of “playing” and “being-in-the world” and Sartre took the activity of playing games as evidence for the existential freedom of human consciousness and its power to transcend the reality of the world as it is. Finally, Eugen Fink has gone as far as to develop a full metaphysics, entirely revolving around the idea of the “play as a world-symbol”. In this lecture I will present some of these views, expound their driving motives, draw a map of their possible connections and question the significance of thinking the “world” from the standpoint of the “play”, and vice-versa.

Reading list

Franz Brentano, *Aenigmatias: Neue Rätsel* (1869).

Edmund Husserl, *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (1916-1919) (Husserliana Materialien IX)

Martin Heidegger, *Einleitung in Die Philosophie* (WS 1928/29) (Gesamtausgabe 27)

Jean-Paul Sartre, *L’imaginaire* (1940)

Eugen Fink, *Spiel als Weltsymbol* (1960)

Inga Römer (University of Grenoble Alpes)

The problem of the world in Heidegger's "metaphysics of Dasein"

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger states that Dasein is never an isolated consciousness, analyzing objects in front of it, but that it is always already in the world: it is "being-in-the-world". World is thus not a being, but it is the totality of signification (*Bewandtnisganzheit*), projected by Dasein itself and in the context of which Dasein understands everything that it encounters. However, this conception of the world seems rather subjectivist, an impression that was widely shared by the first reception of *Being and Time* as anthropology. In the years after the publication of his famous book, Heidegger worked on what he then called a "metaphysics of Dasein", an approach that was supposed to counterbalance the impression of subjectivism and show the metaphysical status of his thinking. Within this new orientation, he proposed a very different conception of the world, a conception that emphasizes our being anchored in the totality of beings (*Seienden im Ganzen*), in kosmos. The seminar will analyze this new conception of the world, its metaphysical implications and its connection to some problematic passages from Heidegger's *Black Notebooks*.

Reading list

Martin Heidegger, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*, edited by Klaus Held, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, « Gesamtausgabe » vol. 26, 1978 (translation *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Indiana University Press, 1984).

François Jaran, *La métaphysique du Dasein. Heidegger et la possibilité de la métaphysique (1927-1930)*, preface by Jean Grondin, Bucarest, Zeta Books, 2010.

Stefan Schmidt, *Grund und Freiheit. Eine phänomenologische Untersuchung des Freiheitsbegriffs Heideggers*, Dordrecht, Springer, « Phaenomenologica » vol. 217, 2016.

Alexander Schnell, *De l'existence ouverte au monde fini. Heidegger 1925-1930*, Paris, Vrin, 2005.

László Tengelyi, *Welt und Unendlichkeit. Zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik*, Freiburg im Breisgau/Munich, Alber, 2014.

Emiliano Trizio (Ca' Foscari University Venice)

On the very concept of Life-World

Husserl's frequent use of the concept of life-world especially during the last period of his philosophical production has often been deemed incoherent or ambiguous at best. Critics have wondered how the life-world can be at the same time a pre-given perceptual world as well as a world laden with cultural predicates, how it can be prescientific and yet include the world of scientific truth, how it can be subjective-relative and yet be the only really existing world, how it can be the universal horizon for all human life and practices and yet be historical, and, finally, how it can be the sense-fundament of science as well as the surrounding world of what is taken for granted, which can itself be loaded with widely used scientific predicates. In this lecture, I will try to show that the notion of life-world is not affected by such ambiguities, nor by the alleged problems concerning what some of Husserl's readers call "the reduction to the life-world". The general outlook underlying this lecture consists in the thesis that the lasting value of the phenomenological tradition consists precisely in the radical way in which it renders thematic the very notion of "world" by rescuing it from objectivism.

Reading list

- Hua IV. Husserl, E. (1952). *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff; *Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book*. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989.
- Hua VI. Husserl, E. (1954). *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff; *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. D. Carr (Trans.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1970.
- Hua XXXIX. Husserl, E. (2008). *Die Lebenswelt*. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Moran, D. (2015). Everydayness, Historicity and the World of Science: Husserl's Life-World Reconsidered. In: L. Učník, I. Chvatík and A. Williams, eds., *The Phenomenological Critique of Mathematization and the Question of Responsibility*. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 107-131.
- Held, K. (2003). *Husserl's Phenomenology of the Life-World*. In: D. Welton, ed., *The New Husserl*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 32-62.

Student presentations

Lorenzo Biagini (University of Pisa)

The Negative Dialectics of Phenomenological Experience: Adornian Perspectives on Husserl

In my paper I would like to show how some Adornian suggestions could enrich the development of Transcendental Phenomenology, especially if the latter is understood as a form of dialectical experience. Adorno's criticism of Husserl is well known and widely studied, so here, instead of focusing prominently on this aspect, I will consider the relation between the two philosophers from a different standpoint. We may see Adorno as a missed pupil of Husserl: he could have been in the same position than Fink's – not only for his age, but above all for theoretical reasons – and we can only imagine the effects of his potential influence on Husserl's thought. Therefore, my paper will examine the relevance of some aspects of Negative Dialectics for Transcendental Phenomenology.

As mentioned above this kind of dialogue is possible only understanding Transcendental Phenomenology in terms of dialectical experience: this possibility depends upon the acknowledgement of the importance of Life-World (*Lebenswelt*), because such a key concept of Husserlian late works gives a dialectical dynamic to his Phenomenology. My core thesis is that the whole Transcendental Phenomenology is an attempt to bring *Lebenswelt* to self-consciousness as constituting life (*leistendes Leben*) or, in other words, to transform a not-fully-self-aware style of experience in a philosophical one without substantially rejecting his mundane (*lebensweltlich*) horizon. Transcendental Phenomenology is the immanent and dialectical transformation of natural life through philosophy, not her negation.

This self-consciousness of Life-World as Transcendental Subjectivity is reached through a peculiar dynamic established between Natural and Transcendental Attitude, in a relation of mutual implication which can easily be defined as dialectical: not surprisingly Fink, since the late '20s, tried to explicitly introduce dialectical elements in Husserl's Phenomenology. However, in my opinion, the Finkian attempt culminating in the *Sixth Cartesian Meditation* still limits Transcendental Phenomenology to a subjective dialectics, mostly because there is still a primacy of Transcendental Subject upon the mundane one and the world in general. According to Fink's *Cartesian Meditation*, Transcendental Phenomenology is the practice through which the subject awakes himself from "dogmatic slumber" to his true form.

In this scenario, Adorno is relevant because his Negative Dialectics strongly refuses this notion of primacy of the (Transcendental) Subject, underlining that the objective moment of experience is a constitutive pole irreducible to the subjective one. In my speech I would like to show how a “phenomenological Negative Dialectics” assigns the objective pole to the mundane moment, i.e. to *Lebenswelt*, emphasizing in an Adornian fashion the importance for Transcendental Subjectivity of a political-material history. “Phenomenological Negative Dialectics” means that Life-World is both the intentional product of Transcendental Life and a constituting moment of the latter, in a continuous movement of mutual implication that never hypostatizes the subjective moment. It will be also shown that this kind of Phenomenology ends in the idea of a mundane-transcendental praxis.

Reading list

TH. W. ADORNO, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. by E. B. Ashton, Routledge, London/New York 2004, esp. pp. 166-207.

ID., *Critical Models. Interventions and Catchwords*, trans. by H. W. Pickford, Columbia University Press, New York 2005, “Dialectical Epilegomena: On Subject and Object” (pp. 245-258).

E. FINK, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation. The Idea of a Transcendental Theory of Method*, trans. by R. Bruzina, Indiana University Press, Bloomington/Indianapolis 1995.

E. HUSSERL, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. by D. Carr, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1970, esp. §§1-7, 51-55 and 59 (pp. 3-18, 173-189 and 208-210).

ID., *Husserliana, Band XXIX: Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Ergänzungsband*, ed. by R. N. Smid, Kluwer, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1993, esp. Text 7 (pp. 77-83).

Noam Cohen (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

Monadology and Being-with: Sharing as a Constitutive Aspect of the World

This paper explores two different senses in which the world is a *shared* and *common* phenomenon. It attempts to confront and evaluate two different possibilities of understanding *sharing* as a primordial and constitutive aspect of the sense of the world as *one* whole. The first is Husserl's notion of a "community of monads" (*Monadengemeinschaft*), whereas the second is Heidegger's conception of "being-with" (*Mitsein*) as "sharing in truth" (*Sichteilen in Wahrheit*).

The paper begins by discussing the basic sense of the world for Husserl as a *common* one. Such commonality, as the "*commonness (Gemeinsamkeit) of Nature*" (CM, 120), has its roots in a *plurality* of subjects, for the world as such is co-constituted by a plurality of compossible transcendental egos, the community of monads. That is, the constitution of the world relies on transcendental intersubjectivity as an open-ended community of co-constituting monads. In Husserl's words, "*the constitution of the world essentially involves a 'harmony' of the monads*" (CM 107). As I will emphasize, the harmonious interplay of monads that constitutes the world is a continuous synthesis of *different* moments of one and the *same* world. But though each monad realizes within itself the same world as accessible to a multiplicity of other monads, those others themselves are not directly accessible, for they gravitate around other centers of experience. The world mirrored in every monad, then, is necessarily given only in a partial manner. Thus, for Husserl the world is shared as an interplay of presence and absence, identity and alterity, on the basis of a manifold of constituting subjects.

The next part of the paper presents Heidegger's different approach to the commonality and sharing of the world, mainly on the basis of his 1928 lectures *Einleitung in die Philosophie*. For Heidegger, the world is always already a shared space of openness (*Offenbarkeit*), prior to any constitution by a plurality of subjects. It is founded upon "being-with", i.e., the necessary fact that Dasein's existence in the world always entails sharing this world with others. However, contrary to Husserl's conception of the sharing of a world by an original plurality of monads, I claim that according to Heidegger sharing is grounded in a prior *undifferentiated* sphere of openness to the truth of being. Rather than being a product of an ongoing process of synthesis, for Heidegger the world as a whole is not divided into separately owned, though interdependent, spheres. We already have it in common in primordial sharing through "letting-it-be". Such shared letting-be (*Seinlassen*) entails unconcealment (*Unverborgenheit*), meaning that before we form any particular compartment to the world, we are first of all part of "a sharing in truth" (GA 27, 118). In sum, it is my contention that contrary to Husserl, for Heidegger the primordial experience of sharing the world does not essentially

entail other subjects as absent, but rather a “with” as an original living presence, “not the indeterminateness of emptiness, but rather of fullness” (GA 27, 142), whose inner complexity flows out of a common “clearing” (*Lichtung*).

Reading list

Heidegger, Martin. 1996. *Einleitung in die Philosophie (1928/29)*. *Gesamtausgabe, Band 27*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

Heidegger, Martin. 1962. *Being and Time*. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper & Row.

Husserl, Edmund. 1960. *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*. Translated by Dorian Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, Edmund. 1973. *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Zweiter Teil: 1921-1928*. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, Edmund. 1973. *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil: 1929-1935*. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Rosario Croce (Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa)

The constitution of the social world. Two alternative phenomenological approaches

My paper will be concerned with the notion of the ‘social world’ in classical phenomenology, with a special focus on Husserl’s and Schutz’s theories. I will tackle the issue, by focusing on two intertwined problems: (1) the constitutive and (2) the socio-ontological one.

I will start out by comparing Husserl’s and Schutz’ accounts of the constitutive problematic in relation to the social realm. As I will try to show, while Husserl is not completely clear about what he means by constitution of social phenomena, Schutz provides a more defined account. In Schutz’ view, indeed, the constitution of the social world consists of two kinds of intentional acts underlying any intersubjective encounter: i.e., a *constructive* one whereby the subjects endow an action with a sense (*Sinnsetzung*), and an *interpretative* one whereby they understand and interpret the meanings of the actions performed by others (*Sinndeutung*).

Then, I will try to point out what I take to be the main drawbacks of the Schutzian approach. On the one hand, indeed, Schutz’ theory seems to be flawed with a *methodological* and *ontological*

individualism, which leads him to reduce any social complex entity to the analysis of the singular episodes of social action (Schutz 1967: 11). On the other hand, Schutz tends to overemphasise the *subjective* and *psychological* aspects of social reality over those aspects which are objective, irreducible to human agency, and independent of subjective experience. In this regard, it is quite telling that Schutz' analysis of the social world amounts ultimately to the analysis of the various "degree[s] of intensity" of one's experience and understanding of the others [*Fremdverstehen*].

These criticisms of Schutzian approach will bring me to the systematic proposal of my paper. After having drawn attention to some Husserlian suggestions which go in the opposite direction to Schutz, I will try to provide arguments in favour of the thesis that a phenomenological approach is consistent with (i) a multi-layered and non-reductive social ontology and (ii) a defence of the objectivity and non-subjective nature of social reality. I will argue this is possible only if we do not conflate the notion of the 'social world' into that of intersubjectivity, and if we recognise accordingly that there are some aspects of the social world that pre-exist the single episodes of social actions as factors constraining and structuring our social experience. My suggestion will be to conceptualize these elements as parts of what Husserl calls the pre-giveness of the world, in particular with reference to its sedimented and historical dimension.

In closing, I will point out the main implications of such a different account of social reality to the problematic of intentional constitution, and I will propose to distinguish three types of constitutive operations responsible, respectively, for the givenness, reproduction and transformation of the social world.

Reading list

Husserl, E. 1952. *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*. "Husserliana", Bd. 4, den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. (engl. trans. by R. Rojcewicz, A. Schuwer: *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1989).

Husserl, E. 1973, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlaß*, "Husserliana", Bd. 14, hrsg. von I. Kern, den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, E. 2004. *Einleitung in die Ethik Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920/1924*. Hrsg. von E. Peucker. "Husserliana", Bd. 37, Dordrecht: Springer.

Schutz, A. 1967 [1932]. *The Phenomenology of the Social World*. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.

Giovanni Fava (Ca' Foscari University Venice)

Between nature and history. The problem of “transcendental geology” in the late Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy.

The aim of this presentation is to explore the concept of “transcendental geology”, outlined by Maurice Merleau-Ponty in one of the last working notes of his *Le visible et l’invisible*.

The working note on transcendental geology is inserted in the context of the phenomenology of the pre-objective developed by the French philosopher in the second half of the '50s with the courses at the Collège de France on the concept of Nature. What is at stake in Merleau-Ponty’s project is precisely the relation between history and nature. In fact, the problematization of the concept of nature took place as a response to the crisis of the concept of history derived from the Marxist philosophy. By redefining the concept of nature, Merleau-Ponty has attempted to bring to light the *constitutive element that ontologically precedes and grounds the historical process*. As indicated by Barbaras, «the concept of nature is a generic title for an examination that deals with a certain type of being, namely, that which *is not instituted*».

Now, the interest that Merleau-Ponty's proposal arouses consists in the fact that such an examination led the French philosopher to rearticulate the link between history and nature in *temporal* terms, recognizing in the nature the "past of all pasts", the "immemorial time", or the “prehistory” from which history is instituted: nature constitutes the pre-objective, the “*être brut*”, the *non-instituted* which makes every historical objectification possible, the *vertical* or *architectural* past that grounds the human present.

In the last phase of Merleau-Ponty's production these theoretical results, related to the identification of a pre-objective layer beneath history, are directed towards a “geological” recognition of the Earth as *Boden* of history, that is to say as the *soil* and *transcendental* origin of human experience. What previously emerged as pre-objective from the analysis of nature is now assimilated to the Earth. The concept of *transcendental geology* represents both the synthesis and the starting point for reconfiguring the relationship between history and nature.

In the first part of the presentation, I will try to trace the passage, so to say, from phenomenology to geology in the late works of Merleau-Ponty, with a special reference to the Collège de France’s course devoted to *Husserl at the limits of phenomenology* and the working notes of *Le visible et l’invisible*. In the second part of the presentation, I will develop the concept of transcendental geology

considering its relations with the problem of nature and showing how it can provide a theoretical paradigm through which rearticulate the relationship between institution, nature and history.

Reading list

M. Merleau-Ponty, *The visible and the invisible*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1968, pp. 258-259;

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E. Husserl, *Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature: The Originary Ark, the Earth, Does Not Move*, in M. Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, cit., pp. 117-131.

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Davide Pilotto (Sorbonne Université/University of Salento)

Lebenswelt and Ethnography. Husserl's Life-world in the Light of the Letter to Lucien Lévy-Bruhl and the Manuscript K III 7

Met in Paris in 1929 at Husserl's lectures that gave rise to *The Paris Lectures* and laid the groundwork for the *Cartesian Meditations*, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, the French ethnologist known mainly for his notions of pre-logical and participation, exerted a strong fascination on the late Husserl, who saw in his work – especially in *La mythologie primitive* – some remarkable thematic proximities to his researches on the life-world, which would shortly afterward be incorporated into the *Krisis*. In the two texts that refer directly to the Parisian anthropologist – the letter of 11 March 1935, available in the *Briefwechsel* volume of the *Husserliana*, and the manuscript K III 7, still unpublished –, Husserl makes no secret of “the burning interest” (Husserl 2008, 349) in “something overwhelmingly new” (Husserl 2008, 351) that he saw in Lévy-Bruhl's work.

In the presentation, we will ask in which measure Husserl's reading of Lévy-Bruhl can provide a significant contribution to the clarification of the problematic status of the life-world. First of all, in the light of the phenomenological literature that has examined the *Lebenswelt*, it can be preliminarily

argued that Husserl oscillates between a life-world understood as the ordinary world of which one has experience (Husserl 1973, §10) and a life-world as a theoretical construction, as an abstraction made from concrete experience, with the *Krisis* often failing to master this semantic shift – an aporetic outcome of which Husserl himself was fully aware (Husserl 1970, §34f). According to Anthony J. Steinbock, we could, in particular, identify four “provisional concepts of the life-world” (Steinbock 1995, 88–96), which would summarise the spectrum of possible interpretations of this notion, although, to reconfirm the *de facto* aporetic outcomes of the debate, Steinbock argues that they “are not assimilable into one coherent, univocal theory of ‘the’ life-world” (Steinbock 1995, 87).

In the light of these problematic issues, we will ask ourselves whether and how the question of the status of the Husserlian notion of *Lebenswelt*, with particular reference to those readings that sustain its ontological commitment (Benoist 1996, Romano 2015), insofar as it is referable to the concrete *Welt* in which we live and thus to our everyday experience, or its “fictitious” or “artificial” nature (Blumenberg 1986), as the result of an idealization analogous to that which occurs in the field of the “objective” sciences, undergoes a decisive reorientation in the light of those positions of Lévy-Bruhl whose theoretical proximity to his own thought Husserl seems to grasp. Can we still propose a “realist” interpretation of the *Lebenswelt* when Husserl, influenced by the French ethnologist, writes that “every human being has a ‘world-representation’, that every nation, every supranational cultural grouping lives, so to speak, in a distinct world as its own environing world, and so again every historical time in its world” (Husserl 2008, 350–351)? How can it be argued at the same time that, for the humanity, the world “is not a ‘world-representation’ but rather the world that actually exists for it” (Husserl 2008, 351)? Which reading of the life-world, with particular reference to Steinbock’s quadripartition of its possible interpretations, seems to be advantaged by what Husserl writes in the light of his reception of *La mythologie primitive*?

In the course of the presentation, in addition to Husserl’s *Letter to Lévy-Bruhl* and the scant literature that considers it – beyond the attention it received in France between the 1950s and 1960s (Merleau-Ponty 1953, Merleau-Ponty 1964, Derrida 1989), one may recall the introductions to its translations (Soulez 1988, De Palma 2008, Moran-Steinacher 2008) and a few sporadic articles on its reception (Jamme 1989, San Martín 1997, Bernasconi 2005, Giovannangeli 2012, De Villers 2016) –, consideration will also be given to the manuscript K III 7, which constitutes, next to the letter, the only other text by Husserl that contains a reflection on Lévy-Bruhl (De Palma 2008, 75): this manuscript, still unpublished, is available at the Husserl Archives in Paris, the institution at which the author of this abstract is currently Visiting Ph.D. Student. Never hitherto taken into consideration by the literature, it may offer a valuable additional resource to understand whether and how Lévy-Bruhl’s

theoretical elaboration and Husserlian reflections on it play an important role towards a better understanding of the notion of life-world.

Reading list

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Husserl, Edmund (1970). *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. Translated by David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.⁴

¹ Text whose original version in German has not yet been included in the *Husserliana* series.

² Critical edition: Husserl, Edmund (1994). “Husserl an Lévy-Bruhl, 11. III. 1935”. In *Husserliana: Dokumente. Band 3. Briefwechsel*. Vol. VII. Edited by Karl Schuhmann. Dordrecht: Kluwer. pp. 161–164.

³ Methodological note: the manuscript is preserved both in the Husserl Archives in Leuven and, in the typewritten transcription, in those of Paris, where I will be Visiting Ph.D. Student from the end of May to the end of August. This opportunity will give me the possibility to have access to it.

⁴ Critical edition: Husserl, Edmund (1976) [1st pub. 1954]. *Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke. Band 6. Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie*. Edited by Walter Biemel. Den Haag: Nijhoff.

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Anne Kirstine Rønhede (University of Koblenz-Landau)

Nature as the Limit of Truth?

Martin Heidegger reconceptualizes truth phenomenologically as unconcealment. This conception of truth may be interpreted as linking different ways of being with different ways of disclosing and uncovering. From this starting point, I will examine the relation between nature and truth along the following lines:

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger describes three different ways of being: 1) beinghere (Dasein), 2) availability (Zuhandenheit), and 3) occurrence (Vorhandenheit). Paired with these, he specifies unconcealment as 1) understanding of being (disclosure), 2) uncovering by handling, and 3) uncovering by predication. Thus, truth as unconcealment can be understood as a pluralist concept of truth. Now, since beinghere, availability and occurrence are not the only ways of being we encounter, we may try to give a detailed account of unconcealment regarding *further* ways of being. If we take nature to *be* in its own distinct way – differently than humans, tools, and mere objects – then the question arises, how to describe unconcealment with regard to nature’s way of being. But in this case we are immediately confronted with the more basic question, whether nature as “a limit case of the being of possible innerworldly beings” (*Being and Time*, 65) can actually be uncovered as such. Although Heidegger may be said to have used different concepts of nature – or alternatively may even be interpreted as not having developed any *distinct* concept of nature – we can discern a tendency of questioning whether nature *as such* can be assigned the possibility of being uncovered. This tendency is apparent for instance when he speaks of nature as “what ‘stirs and strives’, what overcomes us, entrances us as landscape, remains hidden.” (*Being and Time*, 70).

If nature as such cannot be uncovered, or rather, is uncovered as what “remains hidden”, then the domain of natural entities that traditionally is accountable of truth – for instance by providing objects that according to classical theories of truth *correspond* to propositions – in this context on the contrary fall out of the scope of truth. With the same consequence, it can be questioned whether modern natural science, when viewed from a phenomenological (Heideggerian) starting point, indeed interprets *nature* as such, or only examines occurrent entities. In other words, from the starting point of connecting truth with being, and on the basis of the attempt to describe the being of nature as such,

it may appear that the entities which we traditionally consider as playing an important role for truth, namely the things as they are in nature, in this case are not relevant to the subject of truth.

My presentation will consist of three steps: First, I will sketch out Heidegger's idea of truth as unconcealment as a pluralist conception, according to which different ways of unconcealment are linked with different ways of being. After treating the way of being of nature as such in a second step, I will finally discuss the possibility of disclosing this way of being and consider the consequences of (the lack of) such a possibility.

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— *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit*. Freiburger Vorlesung, Wintersemester 1929/30, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Hrsg.), GA 29/30.

— *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet*. Freiburger Vorlesung, Wintersemester 1931/32, Hermann Mörchen (Hrsg.), GA 34.

— *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, Freiburger Vorlesung, Sommersemester 1935, Petra Jaeger (Hrsg.), GA 40.

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Xingchen Mao (Maynooth University)

Horizon and the Experiential Normality of Lifeworld

The word ‘horizon’ has various meanings according to circumstances: a ‘line’ against the sky; a ‘limited range’ of a person’s experience; a ‘layer’ of soil, etc. On the other hand, the various meanings seem to be identified and unified in literal and/or metaphorical senses, in Husserl’s transcendental characterisations of ‘world’ as such, trackable throughout the development of his thought in such as, for example, *Erfahrung und Urteil, Krisis* and specifically *Ideen I*, §§28, 47, 69, 151. This paper explores to the role ‘horizon’ plays in ‘the world’. It addresses both the individual subjective account as well as the intersubjective account for significance of ‘horizon’ in the constitution of what Husserl calls ‘lifeworld,’ and also understands the dynamics of horizon through considerations of a sense of normality. The paper is divided into three parts. The first part discusses the horizon of sense, with particular focus on the constitution of senses as temporally-habitually situated in the subjective sphere. The second part discusses their relations with world-horizon (*Welthorizont*) and lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*) in a fuller, intersubjective sense. The third part discusses the sense of horizon, in dialogue with D. Welton’s construction of horizon as “background” and “context” in *The Other Husserl*. Through it I suggest that a mindfulness of *normalcy* in a direct-experiential sense and *normality* in a reflective sense is necessary if we want to be faithful to the actual dynamics of horizon. The conclusion is drawn through exploring the normative impact of horizon on the ‘hermeneutic circle,’ arguing for an expansive (non- enclosing) understanding of the ‘circle’ in reflective experience.

Reading list

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Husserl, E., *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, Hua I

Husserl, E., *Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Ergänzungsband: Texte aus dem Nachlass 1934-1937*, Hua XXIX

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