SSPPP 2024

Ca' Foscari University Venice
ABSTRACTS OF THE SEMINARS

Nicolas de Warren (Pennsylvania State University)

The Great Camouflage

Strangers, foreigners, alien are terms that aptly capture the plight of colonized peoples who find themselves unable to recognize themselves, their culture, or their world, on their own terms, on terms not imposed by an estranging violence that renders having a home in the world impossible. In this session, I propose to examine Frantz Fanon's Black Skins, White Masks, the writings of Suzanne Césaire, and Ralph Ellison's The Invisible Man. Through this concatenation of readings, my aim is to outline a phenomenology of racialized estrangement. How do these forms of alienation compare and contrast with economic and political alienation? What psychiatric symptoms express colonial alienation? What does it mean to inhabit and perceive a body not entirely of one's own and speak a language not of one's own?

Reading list

Frantz Fanon, *Black Skins, White Masks*
Aimé Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism*
Suzanne Césaire, *The Great Camouflage*
Ralph Ellison, *The Invisible Man*
Chinua Achebe, *Things Fall Apa*

Matteo Giannasi (Ca' Foscari of University Venice)

Stranieri Ovunque/Foreigners Everywhere: a tentative phenomenological introduction to La Biennale di Venezia's 60th International Art Exhibition

The seminar will address philosophical and phenomenological issues raised by the 60th International Art Exhibition, *Foreigners Everywhere/Stranieri Ovunque*, curated by Adriano Pedrosa.

Over the past fifty years, biennials have evolved into curated exhibitions whose format, structure and content are informed and legitimated by explicit philosophical and political arguments as well as aesthetic or artistic ones. Contemporary art exhibitions can, therefore, be experienced and interpreted from a philosophical perspective as well as from an artistic one.

La Biennale di Venezia's International Art Exhibition is the largest contemporary art exhibition in the world, with more than three-hundred artists in the main exhibition, eighty-seven

autonomous exhibitions organised by the participating countries and over thirty collateral exhibitions submitted by non-profit organisations. The 60th edition is entitled *Foreigners Everywhere/Stranieri Ovunque*.

The title of the exhibition is inspired by a series of neon sculptures by the artist collective Claire Fontaine, that render the phrase "Foreigners Everywhere" in more than fifty different languages. The words 'Foreigners', 'stranieri', 'étrangers', 'Fremde', 'ξένοι', 'זרים', 'иностранцы' play linguistically similar roles, but have slightly different connotations, which correspond to different interpretations of otherness: Claire Fontaine's artwork introduces the issue of translation into the political and social question of the relation between otherness and identity. What does it mean to be a foreigner? How is foreignness expressed by different linguistic communities? What is the opposite of being a foreigner? What is it like not to be a foreigner? Is the foreigner the outsider, the stranger, the guest, the enemy, the newcomer?

The seminar will present artworks and discuss catalogue entries and other texts accompanying the 60th International Art Exhibition, which articulate the curatorial choices and discourse of the artistic director in terms of categories that are both politically and philosophically charged. In particular, the the discussion will address the curator's and artists interpretations of the following four forms of strangeness or otherness:

1) the nomad, the diasporic subject, the expatriate, the migrant, the refugee;

2) the queer, the gender non-conforming, the individual who does not fit in received categories or views regarding identity and attraction;

3) the outsider, the self-taught, the informally trained, the one whose output is not part of official circles;

4) the indigenous, the member of a community that identifies itself also via a special relationship to an ancestry and a territory, in opposition to a legal or political system which has marginalised it as a consequence of a process of colonisation or settlement.

The seminar will also introduce epistemological issues pertaining to the inclusion or exclusion of artists and artworks in the canon of modern art as a consequence of their associated with a specific culture, gender, or nationality.

Claudio Majolino (University of Lille)

The Other and the Addressee. Remarks on Husserl's Phenomenology of Communication

According to Husserl the common world "is constituted by *specifically social acts*, *acts of communication* in which the ego turns towards the others (*an Andere wendet*), in which the ego is also aware of these others as those to whom it turns (*an welche es sich wendet*), and even as those who understand this turn (*Wendung*), possibly adjust to it in their behaviour, turn back to it (*zurückwenden*) in acts of agreement or disagreement, etc" (Hua IV, 194/204). In this lecture we will focus on the structure of what Husserl calls the "turn" (*Wendung*) or the "address" (*Adressierung*) (see Hua XX/2, p. 48), i.e. the distinctive intentional-constitutive structure responsible for the crucial shift from *sheer intersubjectivity* — understood as the experience of alien otherness (*Fremderfahrung*) grounded on acts of "empathy" (*Einfühlung*) — to *shared intersubjectivity* — understood as the experience of social otherness (*soziale Erfahrung*) built upon acts of communication (*Kommunikation*). Some political implications of this distinction will be also discussed with respect to Husserl's understanding of social conflicts.

Reading list

Husserliana IV
Husserliana XIII
Husserliana XX/2

Ilaria Malaguti (University of Padova)

The Other and the touch

I would like to offer a reflection on the subject of touch from a philosophical (specifically: phenomenological) point of view. Although eyesight had been traditionally favoured and preferred for a long time, touch has a privileged position in the phenomenological hierarchy of *sensibilia*, since it involves all the skin and the whole body. In fact, touch is one of the senses that we use to get closer to each other; it constitutes a fundamental requisite for establishing a relationship with others.

Reading list

M. Merleau-Ponty, *Fenomenologia della percezione*, Milano, 2003 [1945]
J.-L. Nancy, *Il senso del mondo,* Milano 1997.
J. Derrida, *Le toucher, Jean-Luc Nancy,* Paris, 2000

Gian Luigi Paltrinieri (Ca' Foscari University of Venice)

Translating the Other, Translating the Uncanny, Translating the Enowning (M. Heidegger)

This paper will address the issue of the other by reflecting on the phenomenon of translation, in particular starting from Heideggerian considerations, but also from those of Walter Benjamin and Jacques Derrida. The other is here, in the surrounding world (*Umwelt*) that is familiar to me, in the streets of my city, in the dialect spoken in my town, in the jargon of my professional discipline. My house is full of guests and the first of these guests is myself. M. Heidegger dedicates important considerations to translation, according to which translation preserves the distance of the other, rather than bringing it/her/him closer and assimilating it/her/him. Translation is a relationship with the astonishing ("*das Befremdende*") (see M. Heidegger, *Basic Concepts*, § 20; *Grundbegriffe*, GA 51, p. 96). The paper will address two further questions: 1) why are the other, her/his/their foreign language, her/his/their ways of thinking and feeling far from me, translatable? 2) As to Shylock's request (Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice*) -- a pound of living flesh as repayment of a loan of three thousand denarii -- is it just a market equivalence, or is it, more properly, a translation?

Reading list

W. Benjamin, On Language as Such and on the Language of Man, ed. by M. Bullock and M.W. Jennings, in W. Benjamin, Selected Writings. Vol. 1, 1913-1926, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1996, pp. 62-74.
W. Benjamin, The Task of the Translator, ed. by M. Bullock and M.W. Jennings, in W. Benjamin, Selected Writings, Vol. 1, 1913-1926. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1996, pp. 253-63;
J. Derrida, What is a relevant Translation?, in «Critical Inquiry», 27, 2, 2001, pp. 174-200;
M. De Villa, "Wie eine Äolsharfe vom Winde berührt" Translation in Walter Benjamin's Early Writings, in «JoLMA», 3(2), 2022, pp. 223-248;
M. Heidegger, Basic Concepts, transl. by G. E. Ailesworth, Indiana University Press 1998;
M. Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy: (From Enowning), transl. by P. Emad and K. Maly, Indiana UP 2000;
M. Heidegger, Off the Beaten Track [Holzwege], Cambridge UP, 2002;
M. Heidegger, Pathmarks, ed. by W. McNeill, Cambridge UP, 1998;
W. Shakespeare, Il mercante di Venezia, a cura di D. Calimani, Marsilio, Venezia 2016;
W. Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, ed. by M.M. Mahood, Cambridge UP 2003;
M. Cavazza, Heidegger and the Problem of Translating the Greek Beginning, in «JoLMA», 3(2), 2022, pp. 181-211;
G. Giometti, Martin Heidegger. Filosofia della traduzione, Quodlibet, Macerata 1995;
E. Nardelli, Al bivio della traduzione. Heidegger e Derrida, Padova University Press, Padova 2021;
G.L. Paltrinieri, F. Camera, Translation as Interpretation. Introduction, in «JoLMA», 3(2), 2022.

Audran Aulanier (EHESS, Paris)

Ethnography of Foreigners or phenomenology of the Alien? A few words about attention, care, and hospitality

In this talk, I will link two lines of my research. Firstly, an ethnographic study of foreigners: asylum seekers arriving in Europe. Secondly, a philosophical reflection on the phenomenology of the alien, based particularly on the work of Bernhard Waldenfels. The aim is to see how phenomenology can provide solid support for the sociologist in demonstrating the pathologies of attention from which asylum seekers suffer. The work of caregivers will be analysed in particular, insofar as it offers foreigners a way of experiencing hospitality. On the basis of phenomenological descriptions coming from fieldwork, I characterise this inter-attention (between asylum seekers and caregivers – social workers and volunteers) as a particular mode of hospitality. From this, I conclude by sketching an ethics of attention.

I will begin with a brief presentation of Waldenfels' phenomenology of the stranger. For Waldenfels, the self emerges by responding to the requests of the alien. This stranger (Das Fremde) is to be found both in the intersubjective sphere and in the environment (things, noises, events, etc.). This presentation of Waldenfels's work will provide an opportunity to discuss it in relation to pragmatic sociology, which is focused on the capacities of actors and therefore combines well with the idea of responsiveness developed by Waldenfels. This discussion will highlight the capacity of phenomenology to serve as a methodological tool for the social science practitioner. Secondly, I will

describe the situation of asylum seekers in Europe, showing that, perpetually stimulated by the states receptions systems and their life as asylum seekers, their capacity to direct their attention becomes jeopardized. Thirdly, I will describe four ethnographic scenes and analyse them using the phenomenological tools mentioned above. Through the prism of responsiveness, phenomenologists such as Schütz, Derrida, Vanni and Depraz will be discussed. Finally, I will develop an ethic of attention and care based on the above descriptions. This ethic distances itself from a Levinasian ethic of the Other, which presupposes the Other as a starting point, and takes on the features of a responsive ethic as described by Bernhard Waldenfels. The ethics of attention as a mode of hospitality that I am proposing is finally a practical variant of the German phenomenologist's developments on intermediate domains, which belongs neither to me nor to the alien.

Reading list
Alloa Emmanuel, 2010. « Par-delà la reconnaissance. L'attention comme paradigme pour une éthique asymétrique », Alter. Revue de phénoménologie 18, p. 125-141.
Schütz Alfred, 1944. "The Stranger: An Essay in Social Psychology", American Journal of Sociology 49, no. 6, p. 499–507.
Vanni Michel. 2009. L'Adresse du politique. Essai d'approche responsive. Paris : Cerf.
Waldenfels Bernhard, 2012. 2012. « Responsive Ethics », in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology, ed. D. Zahavi. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Delia Popa (Villanova University)

The Other Within: Elements for a Feminist Phenomenology of the Stranger

In response to the question "Which Others are included or excluded, remembered or forgotten, visible or invisible within contemporary societies?", this seminar will examine the problem of the other from the perspective opened by debates about the sexual difference. What happens if the other is a woman and what does it mean for a woman to feel like another, with its own way of being a stranger in this world? Exploring the contradictions of the feminine mode of appearing, we will focus our attention on its relationship to reproductive labor. How can we understand phenomenologically the attachment women have to domestic work, the care for others, and for the preservation of common spaces of living? Given the fact that women are the ones that often take in charge the material organization of the household, shaping everyone's broader relationship to the environment and to the lifeworld, how should their otherness be understood?

  We will first examine certain aspects of the feminist debate about the sexual difference, highlighting the phenomenological dimension of the feminine as "another within". We will also revisit Emmanuel Lévinas', Jean-Paul Sartre's and Michel Henry's interpretations of Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity, with the goal of reflecting more broadly on the possibility of a feminist phenomenology of the other. More directly to the problem of sexual difference, we will ask ourselves if the feminine is a mere variation of the Husserlian pairing, passively associated to a generic consciousness that is neutral, or if it should be rather considered as part of an asymmetric relation that is largely responsible for the power dynamics of our social world.

Reading list

Edmund Husserl: *Cartesian Meditations* V
Emmanuel Lévinas: "The Dwelling" and "The Ambiguity of Love" in *Totality and Infinity*
Jean-Paul Sartre: "The Gaze" in *Being and Nothingness*
Michel Henry: "Pathos-with" in *Material Phenomenology*
Simone de Beauvoir: *The Second Sex* II
Luce Irigaray: *This Sex which is not One*

Other resources

Silvia Federicci: *Wages against Housework*
Shulamith Firestone: *The Dialectic of Sex*
Frigga Haug: *Beyond Female Masochism*

Emiliano Trizio (Ca' Foscari University of Venice)

Contribution to the phenomenology of occupation

After recalling some essential features of Husserl's notion of home world and its relations to possible alien worlds, we introduce a phenomenological concept that is meant to capture a specific form of intentional modification of the environment familiar to a community. Such modification, which we will denote with the German term "*Besetzung*" occurs due to the interaction with a subjectivity that is the bearer of different and discordant apperceptions. Subsequently we will show how this phenomenological concept can be applied to cast light on a specific social phenomenon, namely the long-term occupation of Kashmir by the Indian army. By means of the notion of "*Besetzung*", and drawing on data collected during a field study in the region, we will interpret the effect of military occupation on the normality of Kashmiri social life as the alienation and the estrangement of Kashmiris from what is most familiar: their land, their home, and as the impossibility of being an "us" in their own territory.

Reading list

Husserliana XV
Husserliana XXXIX
Anthony J. Steinbock (1995) *Home and Beyond. Generative Phenomenology after Husserl*
Brännlund, E. (2024). *In/secure childhoods: Children and conflict in Kashmir*. Childhood,

Student presentations

Kate Khan (RUDN University) *Phenomenology of jealousy and enviousness: pre-condition of emulation and competition*

Why does someone feel jealousy or envy instead of sympathetic joy or support? Can philosophy define and explain any ontological and subjective conditions, which could explain this difference? My starting point of this phenomenological research can be traced back in Spinoza's Ethics (Book 3, Prop. 27), from which we may deduce the following statement: the very specific "conceiving" of the images of things is enough to make someone affected. The "imitation of emotions", according to Spinoza, has two forms — compassion and emulation. The latter is also called "imitation of emotions", and this imaginative bond of emulating (based on "our conception that others have the same desire", Def. XXXIII) becomes a condition for competition, rivalry and reciprocity. Another provoking thesis by Spinoza, which highly interests me — "men, thinking themselves to be free, feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards anything else" (Book 3, Prop. XLIX). But these "more" or "less" are resulting in qualitive and not quantitive affective subjective states and attitudes. So, the question which interests me, is following — what kinds of imagined desires could be discovered further, if we apply phenomenological method? And what role does the lack of compassion plays here? Is it possible to classify different attitudes towards the Other depending on the certain combinations of compassion and emulation?

Taking into consideration E. Stein's phenomenological analysis of empathy and Sartrean investigation of the role of the Other's gaze as affirming or negating my freedom, I would like to distinguish several aspects of compassion and emulation. They can also be variated based on difference of attitudes towards the Other (which is seen as an approved and recognised as someone equal to me or someone like me (simply another), as radically impenetrable and mysterious Other (Alien or Stranger), as hierarchially pre-determined as opposite, either inferior or superior to Me; the Other as someone in the process of being-discovered or still undiscovered by me).

The theoretical foundation for this work was based on comparison of phenomenological (Sartrian), semiotical (Greimas) and anthropological (Girard) approaches towards the nature of competitive affects, the complex distinction between jealousy and enviousness and their possible political implications (shown, for instance, by M. Nussbaum). In all mentioned theoretical models (which I would briefly present further), I noticed one missing point: there is a description of a certain desire and certain lack — but the neutralising affectus is not mentioned, at least, explicitly (while we could find this in Levinas' ethics and very briefly — in Nussbaum). My suggestion is to focus on the negative condition of competition and rivalry. The lack of compassion and capacity to feel pain as something common leads to various forms of competitive approaches — either jealousy, enviousness I would like to critically reconsider these philosophical models. Also I would like to present a case of phenomenological literary analysis, taking a poem by Marina Tsvetaeva "I'll conquer you from all lands, from all the sky..." as the pure example of the phenomenological description of emulative desire, which neglects the otherness of the Other and leads to total destruction of both Self and the Other in the covetous desire of new individuation-melting process.

Iván Vial (University of Heidelberg) *The body as alienness within the own*

In the wake of Waldenfels's pioneering investigations, the question of the alien is increasingly attracting attention in phenomenological research. An enticing aspect of Waldenfels' phenomenology is that the classical philosophical question of the other becomes an aspect of the broader field of the alien (*Fremd*) or alienness (*Fremdheit*) (Waldenfels, 2011, p. 72). Starting from Husserl's paradoxical givenness of the alien, i.e., the "accessibility of the originally inaccessible" (Husserl, 1960, p. 114), Waldenfels argues that everything that announces itself as something accessible *in* its inaccessibility belongs to the field of the alien—and this includes for example the other's alienness, cultural alienness, and one's own (cf. Waldenfels, 1997; 2000; Ch. 7; 2002, Ch. 5). Whereas the alienness lying outside ourselves still attracts most attention, our own alienness remains highly unexplored.

The general aim of this presentation is to argue that there is indeed alienness within us, and that our body is its emblem. Rather than arguing that the body is wholly self or wholly alien, I defend a structural dualism between bodily selfhood and alienness. The background to the argument is rooted in problems arising from psychopathology. Some mental illnesses, such as depression, anorexia, schizophrenia or body integrity identity disorder, involve—to varying degrees—experiencing the body as alien (e.g., De Haan and Fuchs, 2010; De Vignemont, 2018; Fuchs, 2005; Svenaeus, 2013). What are the 'conditions of possibility' for such states? If normality is bereft of any bodily alienness, it becomes difficult to understand how these extreme bodily alienations can take place. In other words, by exploring the alienness of the body as such, the continuities and discontinuities between normality and pathological bodily alienation become more intelligible at a theoretical level and can be better studied at an empirical level.

The structure of the argument is as follows: First, I present Waldenfels' triple polysemy of the alien, in which each dimension of meaning of the alien is presented according to a corresponding contrast, namely: 1) interior/exterior, 2) self/other ownership 3) familiar/strange (cf. Waldenfels, 2011, p. 71f). I interpret these dimensions as reflecting not only semantic nuances, but also specific structures of experience oscillating between selfhood and alienness. Second, I describe the basic interior/exterior contrast as reflecting the lived body and object body distinction (Scheler, 1973; Husserl, 1989). Whereas there is a sort of indifference between lived body and self, the object body exhibits alien characteristics, such as elusive self-perception (Husserl, 1989; Valéry, 1941) and social exposure/vulnerability (Sartre, 1956; Fanon, 1986). Third, I delve into the self/other body ownership. I argue for an ambiguous ownership: in one sense I 'rule and govern' my body (Husserl, 1960) and in another the body rules—this latter type of experience being patent in illness and other confrontations with the inaccessible biology of the body (Böhme, 2010; Leder, 1990; Waldenfels, 2002; Zaner, 1981). Fourth, I thematize the contrast between familiarity and strangeness, where I locate and describe the display of more extreme and psychopathological experiences of bodily alienation. Fifth, I resume the argument and conclude.

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Zaner, R. M. 1981. *The context of self: A phenomenological inquiry using medicine as a clue*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.

Marco Cavallaro (RPTU Landau) *Being Elsewhere: A Genetic Phenomenological Reflection on Exile Displacement*

Exile, a pervasive aspect of human history, reflects the embedding of the human subject in a place and the negative consequences of being uprooted. This paper adopts a phenomenological perspective to explore the subjective conditions inherent in the experience of exile, with a particular focus on the displacement involved.

In exploring the unique phenomenology of exile, the paper argues that a genetic phenomenological standpoint (Lohmar 2013) is apt to describe the disembedding of the exile subject's habits as a result of the experience of displacement. This disembedding is the consequence of the phenomenon of "hysteresis" (Bourdieu 2010), which amounts to the built-in delay between the moment of forging and the moment of activation of habits. Hysteresis thus accounts for the gap between the exile's habits and their experience of place. Unlike other forms of displacement, the paper argues that the exile's uprootedness is irreparable, as their habits remain anchored to the homeland even when physically located in a foreign world (Steinbock 1995).

This displaced state is similar to living in a "median state" (Said 2000), where the old and the new, the homeworld and the alien world, coexist in an intricate but impossible connection. The sense of disorientation experienced by the exile (Améry 1980) is attributed to the failure of "typification" (Schutz 1944), a consequence of the disembedding of their habits. The "habits of home" (Flusser 2004) persist as an indelible memory in the body (Fuchs 2012), contributing to the existential challenge the exile faces in reconciling a lost attachment to place. In sum, this paper employs a genetic phenomenological lens to unravel the complexities of exile displacement, shedding light on the irreparable disjunction between the exile's habits and their physical location, resulting in a perpetual median state of existence.

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Delphine Choquel (University of Sheffield) *Non-Human Animals as Ethical Others*

Non-human animals are often thought of as alien beings lacking any ethical status. Like other marginalised groups, they are commonly othered and excluded from moral considerations. My talk explores the ethical status of non-human animals in Levinas' system. In French and Anglophone scholarship, Levinas' ethics is widely interpreted as anthropocentric by scholars such as Jacques Derrida (2008) and Corine Pelluchon (2020). Anthropocentrism is the view that humans are the only ethically valuable beings which leaves non-human animals "outside of the ethical circuit" (Derrida, 2008, p. 106).

In this paper, I will challenge Derrida and Pelluchon's criticisms of Levinas and argue that all non-human animals can be encompassed within Levinas' theory because they possess what he terms a 'face' and qualify as ethical 'Others'. While Derrida (2008) and Pelluchon (2020) argue that non-human animals are excluded from Levinas' ethical system because they lack the 'Other''s alterity and remain alien to our ethical tradition, I argue that their interpretation of the face is flawed because they misconceptualise the Other's alterity.

For Derrida, "the animal has no face" (Derrida, 2008, p. 107) because "the animal, according to Levinas, seems deprived of all possibility, in fact of all power of saying "Here I am" and of responding, hence of all responsibility" (Derrida, 2008, p. 111). Similarly, Pelluchon argues that non-human animals' physical attributes are not similar enough to the human features Levinas attributes to the face which makes it impossible for them to place an ethical demand on us by proclaiming "You shalt not kill" (Pelluchon, 2020, p. 52).

There are fundamental problems with this interpretation. Both scholars view Levinas' system as symmetrical by arguing that animals need to be ethically responsible for others to possess a face- the determining condition of ethical Otherness. My talk will demonstrate that possessing moral agency and recognising the ethical value of others isn't necessary to possess ethical value due to the asymmetrical character of Levinas' system.

I will develop a fresh interpretation of the face which encompasses non-human animals within Levinas' system. On my reading, there are two active components of the face: *transcendence* and *corporeality*. Levinas defines *corporeality* as an embodied vulnerability to death and wounding, which is shared throughout the animal kingdom. All animals are vulnerable to being hurt or killed and therefore place a demand on ethical agents. *Transcendence* entails a phenomenon exceeding human understanding. As Levinas writes, the Other "presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me", rendering it impossible for me to totally grasp him (2007, p. 51). I'll argue that animals are *transcendent* as long as they resist our total comprehension, whether by behaving in ways we didn't predict; or by refusing to engage with us. There is an element of unpredictability in *transcendence* which is present (to varying degrees) in all animals.

I therefore propose a new phenomenological approach to animal ethics which doesn't view animals as strangers or aliens, but rather as ethical Others for whom we are responsible.

References

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Corine Pelluchon, <u>Pour Comprendre Levinas</u>, (Seuil, 2020)
Jacques Derrida, <u>The Animal That Therefore I am</u>, (Fordham University Press, 2008)

Oda Davanger (Norwegian University of Science and Technology) *Tracing Inscriptions: Can Signs be Embodied?*

The paper, "Tracing Inscriptions: Can Signs be Embodied?" is a chapter in my dissertation "The Politics of Being Seen" that analyzes the linguistic implications of what it means to theorize bodies as *inscripted*, particularly in relation to intentionality. It argues that implications of a structuralist linguistic framework can be unveiled in contemporary work in critical phenomenology, which implicitly foregrounds the phenomenology of embodied inscrition. These under-explored premises does not tackle post-structuralist critique at best, or presents a framework too rigid for ambiguity and fluid axes of meaning at worst, in its analysis of racism and sexism in phenomenological analysies of embodiment.

In critical phenomenology, the notion of embodied *inscription* has been important to investigate the effects of agency on gendered and racialized bodies, as theorized by Iris M. Young and Frantz Fanon in pointing out the shortcomings of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. One of the less theorized elements in critical phenomenology is the cross-cultural shift in inscripted embodied meaning as one traverses countries, cultures and places, although some scholars like Sachi Sekimoto and Helen Ngo have registered these fluidities. I identify structuralist tendencies in Merleau-Ponty that have survived critical phenomenology's double movement of critique and appeal to Merleau-Ponty's texts, particularly his notion of the body schema and intentionality. I invoke Jacques Derrida's critique of Saussurian structuralism, by positing inscription as a form of Althusserian interpellation, and analyzing the body as *trace* instead of sign. If there are strucutralist premises in critical phenomenology, what might the critique of such structuralism provoke in terms of its analysis of otherness? For it is not *inscription* alone that leads to inhibited intentionality, for as black existentialism and feminist phenomenology has pointed out, whiteness and maleness are likewise embodied *inscriptions*. Analyzing the body as trace rather than — implicitly — as sign, interestingly reinvigorates Derrida's critique of Saussure's privileging of speech over writing, and presence over absence, in new gendered terms. Furthermore, this analysis of *inscription* on body-as-trace leads to a tripartate understanding of *inscription* including temporality, language and otherness, in line with Derrida's notion of trace. My post-structuralist analysis of *inscription* does not replace Merleau-Ponty's already temporal notion of habit, but its element of temporality can account for habit as already intertwined with a historicity of *inscribed* imaginaries, signs, and meanings. This paper provides an opportunity to find approaches to the ambiguity of embodied otherness and its effects as inhibited bodily and political movement. The alterity easily distinguishable in gender and race potentially reveals something about the human condition as *inscribed* altogether.
(Word Count: 414)

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Abootaleb Safdari (University of Bremen) *Is ChatGPT Embodied? Understanding Empathy with Disembodied LLMs*

The increasing presence of non-biological entities, such as robots and embodied conversational agents (ECAs), challenges our traditional understanding of "the other," the category of entities we perceive as minded creatures. In line with relationalism and post-phenomenology Safdari (2023; 2021) has developed a framework to understand how we perceive these entities not as mere technological artifacts but as the others. This phenomenologically inspired framework is mainly based on two well-known mechanisms: one perceptual and the other interactive-pragmatic. The first mechanism implies that perception is smart enough to immediately pick up the entities that manifest expressiveness (Gallagher, 2001, 2008; Zahavi, 2014). And secondly, the interactive-pragmatic mechanism implies that the ability to establish a harmonious embodied interaction results in to experience the other as the other.

Now we are seeing the emergence of Large Language Models (LLM), which appear to challenge this framework at first glance. The challenge is rooted in the fact that from one hand, LLMs like ChatGPT, evoke the same experiential relation with the users (Dillion et al., 2023; Jacobs et al., 2023) and from the other hand it seems that the previously mentioned two mechanisms could not be found in this relationship. LLMs lack a face to display facial expressions, so their interaction with people lacks the perceptual component; they also lack a body to interact with people in the same way that a robot or another human can. Thus, it appears that the phenomenological-enactive framework, which was developed to explain our interaction with robots, cannot account for our interaction with LLMs. This paper's primary goal is to investigate whether or not this framework can be expanded to include disembodied otherwares such as ChatGPT.

To this aim, I will examine the perceptual component as the first step. Galit Wellner (2014) for example, makes the argument that screens can be thought of as quasi-faces. She contends, drawing on a Levinasian line of thought, that while screens and faces are different on the ethical level—that is, screens do not demand an ethical response, in contrast to genuine human faces—have essential similarities on an ontological level. I think this line of thought is not sufficiently persuasive. The primary reason, which I will elaborate on, is the inherent differences between faces and screens. This leaves us with the second interactive-pragmatic mechanism.

In order to address this mechanism I will elaborate on the meaning of body and embodied interaction. What does "body" mean in this context? Is it necessarily a tangible, physical body? If so, then it seems that our enactive framework fails to explain our empathic relationship with LLMs. However, if the answer is no, then we need to clarify in what sense LLMs' interactions with people are embodied. I

will argue that current accounts of embodiment in cognitive science and robotics overlook the crucial distinction between the objective and lived body, neglecting the lived body. Then I propose that the lived body is a form of integration that transcends mere causal-mechanical relation. This integration, particularly within social settings, is realized through harmonious interaction. Thus, if an entity has the capacity to build a harmonious action-interaction loop with another person, could be considered embodied in this sense of the word. I will argue that LLMs have the capacity to build this loop and thus could be considered as embodied in this phenomenological sense.

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